USS Silversides (SS-236) — Sixth War Patrol
21 July – 12 September 1943
Patrol at a glance
Commanding officer Lt. Cmdr. J. S. Coye, Jr. (first patrol in command) Base Brisbane, under Commander Task Force 72 Assigned area Solomons – Bismarcks – New Guinea; scouting line south of Truk, 7–26 August Duration 9 days to area · 40 in area · 4 to base · 14 days submerged Miles steamed 12,127 (2,005 to area · 8,687 in area · 1,435 to base) Fuel used 96,930 gallons, plus 15,900 received from USS Coucal en route Contacts 13 ship · 22 aircraft Attacks 3 · 14 torpedoes fired · 4 prematures · no hits confirmed Remaining on return 10 torpedoes · 7,340 gal. fuel · 10 days provisions Result No damage confirmed. Not designated “Successful.”
Silversides went to sea on her sixth war patrol under a new captain, with a new radio meant for wolf-pack work and with Mark XIV torpedoes whose exploders were set for magnetic detonation. Over fifty-three days she made thirteen ship contacts and three attacks. She fired fourteen torpedoes and came home without a confirmed hit. Four of those torpedoes exploded early, short of their targets. The patrol report and its two endorsements show a boat that found targets and pressed them, and a weapon that let her down at the moment of firing.
The Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships gives this patrol two sentences:
“For her sixth war patrol (21 July to 4 September), Silversides patrolled between the Solomon and Caroline Islands. Since she was plagued with malfunctioning torpedoes and a scarcity of targets, she returned to Brisbane empty-handed.”
Prologue: a new captain
Silversides came in from her fifth patrol on 1 July 1943 and began refit at Brisbane the next day, alongside the tender USS Fulton with the Subdivision 82 refit crew. She was docked to find the cause of her slow speed, which turned out to be mainly fouled propellers. During the refit she was fitted with an MN radio transmitter and receiver for use in wolf-pack tactics, and she was wiped (degaussed).
On 20 July Lieutenant Commander Creed C. Burlingame, who had commanded her through her first five patrols, was relieved by Lieutenant Commander J. S. Coye, Jr. The report credits Burlingame with “an outstanding record.” Silversides was ready for sea the next day, with no training period.
Passage north: the wolf-pack exercises (21–28 July)
She got underway from alongside Fulton at 0900 on 21 July under CTF 72 Operation Order S41-43, “to wage unrestricted warfare,” with operations to be controlled by despatch. That afternoon she fired her 4-inch gun and machine guns at a towed target, ran sound tests in Moreton Bay, and joined USS Coucal and USS Tuna.
The passage north became a training run. On 22 July she made a dive to test depth and found minor leaks in the weld around the stuffing box of the new MN aerial. Attempts to peen the weld shut, hammering the metal to close the leak, failed. USS Growler joined that night. For the next five days the four boats worked through approach exercises and a simulated wolf-pack attack, with Coucal as the target and Tuna, Growler and Silversides as the wolves. Coye found he could talk to Growler on the MN set reliably at ten miles and up to twenty in good conditions.
At 0640 on 24 July the officer of the deck, Lt. J. P. Bienia, sighted a black-painted periscope 200 yards off the starboard beam. Silversides turned away at emergency speed and warned the formation. Coucal’s sound search found nothing. Coye did not fire, because USS Drum was nearby and the operation order forbade it.
On 27 July the group entered Jomard Entrance in the Louisiade Archipelago to fuel from Coucal. Silversides lay alongside from 1955 into the early morning and “pounded considerably” — enough to dimple her outer hull near No. 2 ballast tank, as noted later in the defects section. Coye recommended a more sheltered anchorage, better fenders, or fueling with way on. Coucal also gave her fresh water, a spare set of distiller coils, and a welder to work on the leaking aerial gland. She took on 15,900 gallons.
While she lay to, the current had set her well to the west. Leaving in the dark, she cleared the archipelago between the Conflict Group and Lunn Island rather than between Lunn and Torlesse Islands as planned, feeling her way out with the SJ radar, the fathometer, and the QC sound gear echo-ranging on the reefs.
Into the area (29 July – 1 August)
Silversides passed the Laughlan Islands on 29 July, made Buka on the 30th, and slipped between Buka and Green Island submerged. That afternoon she sighted a Mitsubishi Type 97 “Sally” bomber eight miles off. Before dawn on 31 July a large searchlight on Mahur Island flashed a challenge at her, and she dove.
At 0715 that morning she sighted smoke. By 0745 Coye could make out a medium freighter leading, a large freighter about 100 yards astern, a destroyer on either bow of the second ship, and at least two “Dave” floatplanes overhead. He closed at six knots submerged and flooded his tubes. At 0755 the convoy made a large zig away, and by 0825 it was going over the horizon. With enemy air bases close by he did not surface to chase. His comment in the narrative is blunt: “This one was a hard one to miss. Would have been in perfect position if had run on the surface another 15 minutes.”
On 1 August she ran a retiring search curve across the Kavieng–Truk route and turned north.
Two attacks, four prematures (2–5 August)
Attack 1 — 2 August
At 0656 on 2 August, on course 120, Silversides sighted a ship emerging from a squall dead ahead and dove. Coye recognized her as the second ship in the column he had lost on 31 July. He identified her as similar to Kamikawa Maru and probably a converted aircraft tender, since she carried three goalpost masts instead of four.
By 0747 he had her at 2,400 yards with a good angle. Raising the periscope to put in firing bearings, he found she had zigged away. He accepted the poorer track and fired four bow torpedoes at 0750, set at twelve feet, with a nine-second interval and a speed spread of 13 to 16 knots.
The first two torpedoes exploded prematurely. The target saw them, turned, and avoided the other two, then dropped a depth charge and opened fire on the periscope with her deck gun. Silversides surfaced at 0904 with the target still in sight and went after her at 20 knots. At 1000 the target ran into a heavy rain squall. The squall lasted the rest of the day, and contact was never regained. That night Coye sent a message to CTF 72 reporting what he called the day’s disappointment.
His remarks on the attack sheet: the firing position “was not ideal by any means,” but he fired believing at least one or two torpedoes would hit. “Prematures on the first two torpedoes definitely put the odds on the Jap side.”
The squadron's view — Attack 1
Downs, commanding Submarine Squadron 8, called the approach aggressive. But the 150° track forced a 3,000-yard torpedo run, and Downs believed a 70° or 80° track would have been available on the previous leg, before the zig, which the target’s zig plan suggested was coming. The spread was proper. The speed setting may have been too slow for a target capable of 21 knots. He also allowed that the explosions might have been depth charges from the target rather than prematures.
Attack 2 — 5 August
At 0547 on 5 August Silversides sighted masts twenty miles off, heading 170, and ran ahead at 19 knots. She dove at 0900, set her torpedoes at fifteen feet, and began the approach.
At 0918 the masts came into the periscope with an angle on the bow of zero. Bow-on, the ship looked like a destroyer, and Coye reset the stern tubes to eight feet. He opened off the track, thinking she might be screening a larger ship astern. By 0944 she had zigged and he could see a long flat deck between two masts and a single stack amidships. She was no destroyer. The sea was glassy, so his periscope exposures were brief, and he did not reset the depth. He later identified her as a submarine tender of the Taigei class.
He fired four stern torpedoes in thirty seconds:
| Time | Event |
|---|---|
| 0947-00 | Fired No. 7 |
| 0947-08 | Fired No. 8 |
| 0947-15 | Explosion — No. 7 premature |
| 0947-22 | Fired No. 9 |
| 0947-30 | Fired No. 10 |
| 0947-38 | Explosion — No. 9 premature |
| 0948-33 | Explosion near the target, amidships |
The last explosion seemed to come from between the target and the submarine. Coye’s first impression was a depth charge thrown toward him, but it may have been a hit from No. 10. Sound could hear only one torpedo running, which supported a possible hit.
The tender swung toward Silversides. Coye went to 300 feet and rigged for depth charge. Five charges came down between 0951 and 0955, all heavy, none close, all on the starboard quarter. The bathythermograph showed a layer at 175 feet, well above her, and the tender did not echo-range. At 1020 the soundman heard crackling noises he took for a ship breaking up, but Coye doubted it, given how aggressively the target had acted. The screws faded. Silversides stayed down the rest of the day, expecting an air search.
On the attack sheet Coye conceded that the torpedoes “should have been set deeper,” but argued that with a flat calm sea, 50 percent prematures was “far more than the expected percentage.”
The squadron's view — Attack 2
Downs called it an easy approach: the target was relying on her speed and never strayed far from her base course. The short interval between firing and the explosions convinced him that these really were prematures. But the speed spread covered only about 75 percent of the target’s length, which he judged inadequate, and the eight-foot depth on a near-90° track “might well have resulted in ‘duds’” in light of recent tests. He did not believe the target was damaged by a high-order explosion.
The scouting line south of Truk (6–26 August)
At 0745 on 6 August Silversides sighted a large freighter on a southerly course and began an end-around, staying on the surface after a “Dave” floatplane failed to spot her. Coye decided to wait for a night attack. His reasoning, written into the narrative that morning: “So far we have had 50% prematures. This should be more than our share, but felt that in case there should be more, a night attack would still be the best bet.”
At 1334 a message ordered him to proceed at best speed to a submarine scouting line south of Truk and drop whatever he was doing. “Did not like to drop this large MARU,” he wrote. He hoped instead for “a crack at Jap battle fleet,” since a major engagement seemed to be shaping up. He reversed course and sent a contact report, hoping USS Greenling to the south could pick up the freighter. The Japanese tried to jam the transmission, and it took more than half an hour to get it through.
For the next twenty days Silversides patrolled her sector of the scouting line. It was mostly empty water:
- 7 August. A submarine sighted twelve miles off. Coye assumed it was USS Balao from the next sector, not yet told of a change in sectors, and dove to avoid it. Fife’s endorsement disagreed: “The submarine contact must have been enemy.”
- 10 August. A “periscope” on the port beam that turned out to be a stick. That evening, smoke from a small patrol boat accompanied by a second small craft. The patrol boat closed and challenged with a flashing “N.” Silversides dove at 3,000 to 4,000 yards and went below the layer at 175 feet, where she could no longer hear his screws. Coye believed the patrol boat had been sent out to hunt for the scouting line, or to draw attention away from it.
- 13 August. A high-periscope lookout sighted what looked like a submarine’s conning tower and periscope shears over the horizon. Coye hoped it was a Japanese submarine DF’d close by during the night. After more than two and a half hours it turned out to be a large tree floating roots upward.
- 21 August. Before dawn, a red light over a green one: the hospital ship Buenos Aires Maru, properly marked, bound from Truk for Wewak at 15 knots. Silversides photographed her and let her pass.
In between came a steady run of aircraft, most of them unidentified because Coye was diving at first sight rather than risk exposing the scouting line. His fuel ballast tanks ran dry and were converted back to normal ballast tanks. The boat made trim dives, worked on a noisy hydraulic accumulator, and once chased a green flare for six miles that was probably a meteor.
On 26 August she transmitted her scouting-line report. It took well over an hour to raise a station. Then she left the line and headed north to her new area submerged, reasoning that with three boats transmitting from the line that morning, an intensive air search was likely.
The Panama Maru chase (29–31 August)
On 29 August Coye decided he would see more on the surface, and took station on the Truk–Rabaul route at latitude 4°30’ N. At 1012 he sighted smoke 25 miles off, coming in puffs about ten minutes apart, and began an end-around at full speed.
The target was a freighter similar to Panama Maru, making about 9 knots with two small escorts like PC boats, one ahead and one astern. A day submerged approach failed when the target changed course. A night submerged approach failed too: at 2203 Coye found the target through the periscope about 20 degrees past his firing bearing, and could not swing the boat fast enough to catch up. “Should not have gone below radar depth until I had him picked up in the periscope,” he wrote. He surfaced for another end-around.
Attack 3 — 30 August
At 0043 on 30 August, with the target at 11,500 yards, Silversides began a surface approach. Radar picked up the escorts only at about 6,000 yards, one on the target’s port bow and one on the starboard quarter. Coye worked in on a 50° starboard track, keeping a small silhouette and slow speed to minimize his wake, feeding radar ranges and TBT bearings into the TDC every thirty seconds.
He chose a full salvo of six. His reasoning, on the attack sheet: the target was southbound and loaded, and if the earlier rate of prematures held, only three would reach the track. He set them at eighteen feet to reduce the chance of prematures. At 0106 he fired, in the order 3, 4, 5, 6, 1, 2, over 55 seconds.
There were no prematures this time. Two minutes after firing Coye could plainly see four torpedo tracks, three of which seemed to run under the target. No hits followed. The target sounded its whistle rapidly to alert the escorts and fired wild 20 mm tracer. The after escort fired a few rounds from what sounded like a 3-inch gun. Silversides opened at full power on four engines until they began to smoke. Five heavy explosions followed between 0111 and 0113, probably depth charges, possibly torpedoes reaching the end of their run.
She found the same target again that night by radar at 12,000 yards and set up for another attack. At 0257 on 31 August she submerged for the approach. This time the target was pinging directly at her rather than searching, and radar showed another radar operating. At 0345 she could hear the echoes off her own hull. She went to 200 feet, below the layer at 175, and the hunter lost her.
Two readings of the miss
Coye came away convinced that he had been hunting a decoy. In the narrative of 31 August he set out four reasons for suspecting an anti-submarine group:
- The target had a much shallower draft than its appearance suggested.
- The echo ranging came from the target, not the escorts.
- The regular puffs of smoke seemed to say “come on.”
- If Silversides had been DF’d during her transmission that morning, the target had apparently headed toward the spot instead of avoiding it.
The first reason is his explanation for the miss: torpedoes set at eighteen feet running under a ship that only looked loaded. His attack-sheet remarks add that he should have held fire until the range was shorter, or dived and fired by periscope, though on an earlier approach he had been unable to see the target through the periscope at 1,500 yards.
Downs read it differently. He estimated the ship’s loaded draft at 26 feet, and judged eighteen feet “still a little too shallow” for a contact hit, though the sharp track allowed oblique hits that made duds less likely. His criticism was of the geometry. The range was excessive; at a 45° track the target was foreshortened to about 0.7 of its length; and the spread covered about 120 percent of that length, not the “at least 150%” Coye believed he had fired. If the target could barely be seen at 6,000 yards with binoculars, he argued, Silversides could have closed well inside 2,750 yards undetected. He listed three remedies: close the range, use a track between 60° and 120°, and widen the spread.
Evidence
Documented: six torpedoes fired at 18 feet; no prematures; no hits; three tracks appeared to pass under the target (Coye’s observation); Downs’s draft estimate of 26 feet.
Acknowledged speculation: Coye’s anti-submarine decoy theory. The report offers no confirmation, and the endorsements do not comment on it.
Leaving the area and the return (31 August – 12 September)
With her presence known, Silversides moved to a new spot southwest of Mussau, where Drum had reported good hunting. Three days there produced only a floatplane. At 1915 on 3 September she surfaced and left the area on orders from CTF 72.
On 4 September, crossing the Truk–Rabaul shipping lanes on the way south, she made a quick dive to avoid a Kawanishi “Cherry” patrol plane. Her noon position that day was 0°46’ S, 152°16’ E. From the 5th to the 7th she ran submerged by day through waters where, by 7 September, the bombers she sighted were Allied. That evening she sighted Growler on a parallel course.
At 0340 on 8 September she met Growler and the New Zealand corvette HMNZS Tui, her escort, five miles west of Cape Astrolabe on Malaita. The three ran south past Tulagi, Savo and Guadalcanal, through skies full of Liberators and Flying Fortresses and waters full of patrol craft, destroyers, and landing craft. Tui was released that afternoon. The next morning Growler reported a plane on the MN set, and Silversides dove because, as Coye put it, “own planes have been very unfriendly lately in this area.” It was an RAAF B-25. Growler stayed up and identified both boats.
The two boats drilled and practiced radar tracking on the way south, and Silversides arrived at Brisbane at 0800 on 12 September 1943.
Life aboard
The report’s later sections fill in what the narrative leaves out.
Food and health. The food was good and varied, with one exception: Australian rabbit substituted for chicken, most of which had to be surveyed (condemned) as “unpalatable to the entire crew.” The air conditioning worked, and with most of the patrol spent on the surface, habitability was excellent. There were a fair number of sick days. One man injured his eye from the flash of the sun through the periscope, and his vision was impaired. Without a microscope, a suspected case of venereal disease could not be diagnosed aboard, and Coye recommended that submarines be issued microscopes and the medicine to treat it. The sick list records eight cases and 46 sick days.
Radar. The SJ radar was in commission every night but one, giving ranges of up to 14,000 yards on large ships and 6,000 on escorts. The report says this was the best performance the set had given since installation, “due mainly to the constant attention of HAYES, C.R., RT1c.” The SD air-search radar was another matter: out of commission for several days, with “quite a few of the parts… home-made.”
Sound and density layers. Slow screws were heard at about 4,000 yards and fast screws at about 7,000. The bathythermograph proved its worth: on calm days there was usually a negative temperature gradient at about 175 feet, and twice that layer hid Silversides from a hunter. Coye recommended replacing the 250-foot instrument with a 400-foot one. The fathometer failed in the second half of the patrol.
Defects. Beyond the exploders, the trim pump was useless during silent running; No. 2 periscope jammed in high power on the last day in the area; and the hull was dimpled from the pounding alongside Coucal.
Personnel. The report calls the conduct of officers and crew excellent, with morale excellent “despite the negative results of the patrol.”
The MN radio. Coye’s closing remarks are about the new set. It worked well between Silversides and Growler both outbound and homebound, and he saw in it “great possibilities for coordinated attack, tracking, and scouting,” and, if fitted to Allied aircraft, a way to take contact reports directly from them and identify the boat to them.
Ship’s company
64 enlisted men sailed on the sixth patrol. The list is built from the muster roll for the quarter ending 30 June 1943 and the Report of Changes dated 21 July 1943, the date of sailing. Between the two, seventeen men were transferred to Commander Submarine Division 82 and seventeen were received from it, most of them on 15 July. Ratings are as of sailing. The muster for the quarter ending 30 September 1943 confirms the list: every man on it who is not on this one was either received on 27 September, after the boat came home, or added by hand to the typed roll without a date.
One change came on the day of departure. Chief Motor Machinist’s Mate William A. Palmer’s enlistment expired on 20 July. He was discharged that day and reenlisted on board for four years on 21 July, the day Silversides sailed.
Seventeen men were making their first patrol in Silversides. Officers do not appear on the muster or the Report of Changes; of the wardroom, the patrol report names only the commanding officer and Lt. J. P. Bienia.
The plankowners — 12 of 46 still aboard
Twenty months after commissioning, 12 of the 46 enlisted men who put Silversides in commission at Mare Island on 15 December 1941 sailed on her sixth patrol.
Aboard continuously since commissioning (9): Patrick A. Carswell (SM1c), Arthur W., Jr. Clark (CEM(A)), Robert G. Kelly (CEM(A)), William F. Marsh (MoMM2c), Robert F. Messley (MoMM1c), Thomas E. Parson (MoMM1c), Roy C. Riser (MoMM1c), Harold R. Schwartz (TM3c), Andrew M. Smiley (CTM(P))
Plankowners who had left and returned (3): Howard W. Calver (EM1c), James F., Jr. Duckworth (TM1c), Darrell Robinson (SC1c)
Five plankowners on the June muster were transferred in the week before sailing: Robert Anderson, Walter J. Czerwinski, Robert R. Danko and Albert W. Gutzmer on 15 July, and Charles H. Mathewson on 20 July. Czerwinski came back aboard on 27 September 1943 as an acting Chief Torpedoman.
Enlisted crew, sixth war patrol (64)
Name Rating Service number Note ADAMSON, Werner A. MoMM1c 287 28 48 ATKINS, Jack P. SC2c 632 85 77 BOBO, Thomas S. F2c 604 55 21 BOOZE, Raymen C. CFC(A) 355 86 20 CALLAN, William A. F3c 376 75 27 CALVER, Howard W. EM1c 238 66 06 Plankowner (returned) CARSWELL, Patrick A. SM1c 406 24 84 Plankowner CLARK, Arthur W., Jr. CEM(A) 381 23 32 Plankowner CLARK, William H. QM3c 610 19 06 CRISAN, Edward D. MoMM2c 636 19 82 First patrol aboard CROSBIE, Merl L. CM2c 633 59 18 First patrol aboard DAILEY, Joseph C. TM3c 602 37 95 DENNIS, Paul W. TM2c 311 54 95 DETMERS, Robert GM2c 382 84 16 DOUD, Carl E. MoMM1c 299 93 10 DUCKWORTH, James F., Jr. TM1c 258 15 19 Plankowner (returned) FOURNIER, Roland J. SoM3c 606 04 85 GRIFFITH, Charles C. MoMM1c 337 17 37 GRIM, Everett Winfield R. EM2c 382 16 50 First patrol aboard HAGER, Lawrence M. RM2c 382 51 13 HARTLEY, Courtney J. S2c 244 33 74 First patrol aboard HAWKINS, George R. S2c 225 15 77 First patrol aboard HAYES, Charles R. RT1c 660 03 86 HOAGLIN, Floyd W. MoMM1c 311 27 98 First patrol aboard INGRAM, Fred P. STM2c 635 10 10 First patrol aboard JORDAN, Robert C. EM3c 626 02 58 KELLY, Robert G. CEM(A) 201 52 69 Plankowner LA CROIX, Alvin M. S1c 274 82 37 LLOYD, Calvin S. EM1c 658 03 20 LLOYD, Dan T., Jr. F1c 262 81 69 First patrol aboard MARSH, William F. MoMM2c 393 36 39 Plankowner MC MULLEN, Mark G. MoMM2c 258 27 84 MEDITZ, Henry J. EM1c 224 20 38 MESSLEY, Robert F. MoMM1c 336 95 05 Plankowner MULAT, Bernardo A. STM1c 633 80 57 NIXON, William M. EM3c 664 62 32 O’HARA, James T. F3c 652 00 99 ORCUTT, Carl S. QM3c 234 35 66 First patrol aboard PALMER, William A. CMoMM(A) 375 73 09 Reenlisted on board 21 Jul 43 PARSON, Thomas E. MoMM1c 295 54 23 Plankowner PERRY, Kenneth P. CY(A) 381 19 00 POWELL, Victor W. RM1c 201 64 06 RAE, William H. TM3c 383 06 37 REEVES, Lawrence A. S1c 279 94 49 First patrol aboard REMINGTON, Samuel D. RM3c 632 37 95 RINDFUSS, Joseph S. SM3c 625 55 74 RISER, Roy C. MoMM1c 250 48 98 Plankowner ROBINSON, Darrell SC1c 356 38 76 Plankowner (returned) SAAS, Ferrel R. GM2c 614 45 27 First patrol aboard SCANLAN, Cornell W. MoMM2c 337 57 17 SCHWARTZ, Harold R. TM3c 283 56 20 Plankowner SHOFF, Clarence E. F1c 600 24 62 SMILEY, Andrew M. CTM(P) 238 46 68 Plankowner TAYLOR, Burrows A. PhM1c 360 05 64 TETZEL, Paul TM2c 614 02 49 TURBEVILLE, William C. EM3c 295 73 36 First patrol aboard WALKER, Harold G. TM3c 287 52 77 First patrol aboard WATTS, Billy G. RM3c 337 65 40 First patrol aboard WILLIAMS, Robert J. F1c 342 62 38 WILLIAMSON, Joseph C. TM1c 346 69 27 WOJCIECHOWSKI, Michael FC3c 611 76 82 WORKMAN, Newman B. MoMM2c 410 74 75 First patrol aboard YARCHENKO, Edward F2c 622 29 76 First patrol aboard ZAREMBINSKI, Ludwig F2c 652 09 57 First patrol aboard
The verdict
Downs’s endorsement as Commander Submarine Squadron 8, dated 13 September, the day after Silversides returned, is a detailed critique of each attack, summarized in the sections above. He found the boat’s material condition very good on return, with only minor trouble from the No. 2 periscope, the SJ radar, and the fathometer.
James Fife’s endorsement as Commander Task Force 72, dated 25 September, turned to the torpedoes. The exploders of all ten torpedoes remaining aboard were examined and tested and found in perfect condition, and those fired had received no abnormal treatment. All had been set for both magnetic and contact detonation, and all had been modified for improved stability of the magnetic feature under a Bureau of Ordnance letter of 3 May 1943. Two suspected prematures came at eight feet and two at twelve, at small gyro angles, in a smooth sea, on generally east-west courses. Fife concluded that “at least two, and possibly all of the suspected prematures were in fact prematures and due to faulty design of the exploder.”
With no certain damage inflicted on the enemy, the patrol was not designated “Successful” for the combat insignia award.
Context: the Mark VI exploder in 1943
The Mark VI exploder carried a magnetic influence feature designed to detonate the warhead beneath a target’s keel. Through 1943 submarine commanders reported prematures and failures, and the feature was deactivated at different times in different commands. Fife’s endorsement shows that in August 1943 the Brisbane boats were still firing with the magnetic feature active, and that the command now attributed the failures to the exploder’s design.
Torpedo performance
| Attack | Date | Tube | Depth set | Track | Result |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 2 Aug | 1 | 12 ft | 148 S | Premature |
| 1 | 2 Aug | 2 | 12 ft | 150 S | Premature |
| 1 | 2 Aug | 3 | 12 ft | 152 S | Miss |
| 1 | 2 Aug | 4 | 12 ft | 150 S | Miss |
| 2 | 5 Aug | 7 | 8 ft | 110 P | Premature |
| 2 | 5 Aug | 8 | 8 ft | 102 P | Miss |
| 2 | 5 Aug | 9 | 8 ft | 96 P | Premature |
| 2 | 5 Aug | 10 | 8 ft | 110 P | Possible hit |
| 3 | 30 Aug | 3 | 18 ft | 46 S | Miss |
| 3 | 30 Aug | 4 | 18 ft | 48 S | Miss |
| 3 | 30 Aug | 5 | 18 ft | 42 S | Miss |
| 3 | 30 Aug | 6 | 18 ft | 43 S | Miss |
| 3 | 30 Aug | 1 | 18 ft | 45 S | Miss |
| 3 | 30 Aug | 2 | 18 ft | 45 S | Miss |
All fourteen were Mark XIV-3A torpedoes with Mark VI-1 exploders set for contact and influence, and Mark XVI warheads loaded with TPX. Listed in firing order. All four prematures came at depth settings of twelve feet or less; none came at eighteen.
Sources
- U.S.S. Silversides (SS-236), Report of Sixth War Patrol, 21 July – 12 September 1943, with Sections A–U.
- First Endorsement, Commander Submarine Squadron EIGHT, Serial 0146, 13 September 1943.
- Second Endorsement, Commander Task Force SEVENTY-TWO, Serial 0293, 25 September 1943.
- Muster rolls of the crew, quarters ending 30 June and 30 September 1943; Report of Changes, 21 July 1943 (date of sailing).
- Only these two endorsements survive in the Fold3 file. The second endorsement was routed to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, via Commander Seventh Fleet.
Corrections and discrepancies
| Item | Source says | Patrol report says |
|---|---|---|
| End of patrol | DANFS: 4 September | Left area 3 Sep (CTF 72 orders); arrived Brisbane 0800, 12 Sep |
| Fueling from Coucal | Fife: 29 July | Alongside evening of 27 July; underway 28 July |
| Days at sea | Downs: 53; Fife: 54 | 21 July – 12 September |
| Scouting-line message cleared, 26 Aug | Section L: 0602 | Narrative: 0620 |
| 28 July departure | Margin time: 0400 underway | Text: cleared archipelago at 0200 |
| Aircraft contact, 8 Aug | Printed as No. 9 | ⟦sic; sequence indicates No. 7⟧ |
| Noon position, 7 Aug | Printed as Long 14-49 E | ⟦sic; track indicates 149-49 E⟧ |
The patrol report corrects and expands DANFS in three places:
- The dates. The patrol ran from 21 July to 12 September 1943. Silversides left her area on the night of 3 September on orders from CTF 72 and arrived at Brisbane at 0800 on 12 September. The 4 September date most likely comes from Fife’s endorsement, which says she “began her return” that day.
- The area. Her assigned area was the Solomons–Bismarcks–New Guinea area. In practice she worked the shipping routes between Rabaul, Kavieng and Truk, and spent nearly three weeks on a submarine scouting line south of Truk.
- “A scarcity of targets.” She made thirteen ship contacts and attacked three. What she lacked was not targets but freedom to chase them: for twenty days she was held to a scouting line, and on the way to it she was ordered to break off from a large freighter she was trailing.
Method
The report and endorsements were transcribed verbatim from page images by a language model (Gemini), using a prompt that requires uncertain readings to be flagged rather than guessed. Every page was then checked by hand against the original images, and flagged readings were resolved by eye. Errors in the original are kept as printed and marked ⟦sic⟧.